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How should an organization be designed in order to provide its members with minimal 
incentives to defect? And how does the optimal design depend on the type of strategic 
interaction between defectors and remaining organizational members? This paper addresses 
such issues in a game theoretic model of cooperation, in which an organization is formally 
represented by a connected network, and where gains from cooperation are given by a 
partition function. We show that critical structural features of the organization depend in a 
clear-cut way on the sign of spillovers. In particular, positive spillovers favor the adoption 
of dispersed and centralized forms, while negative spillovers favor cohesive and horizontal 
ones. Moreover, if the organizational form determines all the communication possibilities 
of members, a highly centralized organization - the star - emerges under positive spillovers, 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The existence of gains from cooperation, and the potential failure of economic agents to
capture such gains, are a recurrent feature of many economic and social situations. The
game theoretic analysis of cooperation has traditionally focused on the notion of ”coalition”,
by this meaning a set of agents acting towards a common collective interest. In a seminal
contribution, Myerson (1977) has pointed out how the notion of cooperation structure (or
graph or network), can greatly enrich the analysis by fully describing the set of bilateral
relations underlying the emergence of cooperation. In Myerson’s framework, a network that
allows all agents to communicate, either directly or indirectly through other agents, can be
viewed as an ”organization”, specifying a set of cooperating members and an ”organizational
form” through which the coordination of individual actions is attained.
Depending on the problem at stake and on the time horizon one considers, cooperation
networks can display varying degrees of ﬂexibility. For instance, social organizations are
shaped by interpersonal relations based on trust or kinship, which are by nature rigid or very
costly to create and destroy. The same applies to networks originating from customs, tradi-
tion, ideological positions or previous commitment, or from the design of a central authority.
By contrast, in certain forms of economic collaborations (such as cartels, R&D collaborations
or international agreements), agents are usually free to modify their links at any time and at
low costs. In this paper we will be concerned with the ﬁr s tt y p eo fr i g i da n dn o nm o d i ﬁable
networks.
The consideration of cooperation networks rather than coalitions raises a series of theo-
retical questions concerning the stability of cooperation. How does the organizational form
aﬀect the incentives and the ability of members to defect and to take independent actions?
Are certain architectures intrinsically more stable than others? Are, for instance, strongly
cohesive organizations always more stable than more dispersed ones? Is centralization always
good for stability?
In order to get some insight into these complex issues, we will address the problem of
stability from a speciﬁc angle, in line with the tradition of cooperative game theory. We
will take as a primitive concept the gains from cooperation that a coalition of players can
enjoy when embedded in a given ”coalition structure”, by this meaning a conﬁguration of
all coalitions active in the system. These gains will be assumed independent of the internal
organization adopted by such coalitions, and to depend only on their external conﬁguration.
2Although this is certainly a drastic simpliﬁcation, overlooking all eﬃciency consideration
that motivate a large part of organization theory1,i ta l l o w su st oi s o l a t et h ee ﬀect of the
network on the stability of cooperation. Moreover, by allowing the gains from cooperation to
depend on the whole coalition structure, we can include in our analysis problems in which the
formation or disintegration of coalitions have welfare eﬀects (or ”spillovers”) on potentially
all players in the system, such as public goods economies, industrial oligopolies, trade blocks,
etc...2.W ew i l lt a l ko fpositive spillovers (resp., negative spillovers) when the formation of a
coalition (or the merger of several coalitions) beneﬁts (resp., hurts) the other agents in the
system (see Yi (1997)).
A ﬁrst set of results we obtain are driven by the way in which such spillovers shape the
incentives of organizational members to defect from diﬀerent architectures. The main in-
gredient, and the novelty, of the present analysis is the assumption that the way in which
members are connected within the organization can be used to predict the degree of coop-
eration that would follow any coalitional defection from the organization. Because of the
presence of spillovers, such predictions are crucial to assess the proﬁtability of such defec-
tions. Consider for instance a political alliance, in which parties B and C can cooperate on
a common programme only thanks to the mediation of A (this may happen, for instance,
because of the distance between B’s and C’s ideological positions). By quitting the alliance,
A is likely to face B and C as singletons in the political competition. Party A would face
ad i ﬀerent perspective if B and C had closer ideological positions, in which case a defection
of A may be followed by the formation of an alliance of B and C. Party A is likely to ﬁnd
the defection more proﬁtable in the ﬁrst case, due to the negative spillovers of political com-
petition. An opposite and symmetric story would apply in a public goods economy, where
spillovers from coalition formation are positive. Here, player A would enjoy the beneﬁts of
free riding on B and C only if these were linked in the network, otherwise A’s defection would
lead to a complete absence of cooperation.
Propositions 1 and 2 generalize the simple mechanics outlined above, providing some basic
insights into the role played by the sign of the spillovers in determining which network is less
vulnerable to defections. In particular, these results relate the cohesion of an organization
1See, among others, thr seminal work of Chandler (1966) and, more recently, of Arrow (1974), Radner
(1993), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994).
2See Yi (2003) and Bloch (2003) for recent surveys of the vast literature on cooperative games with
spillovers.
3to its stability properties, and shows that positive and negative spillovers lead to opposite
conclusions. In particular, sparser organizational forms (in our simpliﬁed framework, trees)
are more stable under positive spillovers, while more cohesive ones (in our framework, the
complete network) are more stable under negative.
A second set of results accounts for a second major force relating the network architecture
(that is, the organizational form) with the stability of cooperation. In addition to aﬀecting
the incentives to defect, the organizational form can indeed determine the communication
possibilities of members, and, therefore, their ability to defect from the organization in a
coordinated manner. In the above example, for instance, in the absence of a direct link
parties B and C may ﬁnd it impossible to communicate if not through A. Unable to make
coordinated plans, B and C would not pose a threat to the alliance as a defecting coalition.
This eﬀect of the network on the ”ability” of coalitions to defect has been shown by Demange
(2004) to induce stability in all superadditive problems without spillovers.3 In this paper, it
allows for sharp results for the speciﬁc case in which the gains from cooperation are equally
shared among cooperating agents. In such egalitarian problems, a single minimally connected
network - the star - is selected as the most stable organizational form in all problems with
positive spillovers. When spillovers are negative, two architectures are selected, with equiva-
lent stability properties: the complete network, in which all pairs are linked, and the circle,
in which all members maintain two links.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic concepts and notation.
Section 3 deﬁnes the notion of stable allocations and stable organizations, presents the main
results and relates them to the design of stable organizations. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Coalitions, Values and Allocations
We will be considering a set N of n players, with generic element i =1 ,2,...n. A coalition of
players is any subset S ⊆ N; in particular, the set N is referred to as the grandcoalition.A
partition πS of S ⊆ N is a collection {B1,B 2,...,B m} of subsets of S such that Bk∩Bl = ∅ for
all k 6= j,a n ds u c ht h a t∪m
p=1Bp = S.Ap a r t i t i o nπS of S is also called a coalition structure
on S. For all S ⊆ N, the set of all partitions of S is denoted by Π(S). The pair (S,π)s u c h
3In non superadditive problems, some stable conﬁguration of coalitions is also shown to exist.
4that S ∈ π ∈ Π(N)i sc a l l e da nembedded coalition. For all (S,π), we denote by π\S the
partition of the set N\S obtained by considering the elements of π except S.
A partition function v associates with each embedded coalition (S,π)ar e a ln u m b e r
v(S,π). Intuitively, the grandcoalition represents a situation where all players in N cooperate
in order to achieve the maximal aggregate welfare; a coalition structure π on N indicates that
several distinct coalitions have formed, within which players cooperate, but across which some
kind of noncooperative strategic interaction takes place.4 So, the value v(S,π) indicates the
maximal aggregate payoﬀ achievable by the members of S when interacting with the other
elements of π.
The following assumptions impose restrictions on the type of strategic interaction taking
place within diﬀerent coalition structures; such assumptions are formulated as properties of
the partition function v.
We start with the assumption of anonymity. A permutation σ is a bijection from N into
N (a relabelling of the set of players). The notation σ(S) will indicate the new coalition
obtained by relabelling the members of S according to σ,a n dσ(π) to indicate the new
partition obtained by relabelling the players in the elements of π according to σ.
Deﬁnition 1 The partition function v is anonymous if for all permutations σ of the set N,
and for all embedded coalitions (S,π), we have v(S,π)=v(σ(S),σ(π)).
We say that v is cohesive if the grandcoalition generates more value than any of its
partitions (there are no decreasing returns to cooperation).
Deﬁnition 2 The partition function v is cohesive if v(N,{N}) ≥
P
B∈π
v(B,π) for all π ∈
Π(N).
A stronger assumption, called full cohesiveness and not used in the present paper, requires
that the same property applies to all embedded coalitions.
The next properties of v classify strategic interaction among coalitions in terms of the
change in the value v(S,π) that occurs in response to changes in the conﬁguration of the
sub-partition π\S. This classiﬁcation, proposed in Yi (1997), makes use of the preliminary
notion of ”concentration” of a partition.5
4See Ichiischi (1981) for a concept of strategic equilibrium associated to a coalition structure.
5This deﬁnition is weaker than that used by Yi, but is suﬃcient for the results of the present paper.
5Deﬁnition 3 Let S ⊆ N. The partition π ∈ Π(S) is a concentration of π0 ∈ Π(S) if π 6= π0
and if it is possible to originate π by merging elements of π0.F o r m a l l y ,π is a concentration
of π0 if for all B ∈ π either B ∈ π0 or there exists a collection {B1,..,B p} of elements of π0




Deﬁnition 4 The partition function v exhibits positive spillovers if v(S,π) >v(S,π0) for
all embedded coalitions (S,π) and (S,π0) such that π is a concentration of π0.
Deﬁnition 5 The partition function v exhibits negative spillovers if v(S,π) <v (S,π0)
for all embedded coalitions (S,π) and (S,π0) such that π is a concentration of π0.
Intuitively, positive spillovers arise when a coalition beneﬁts from the merging of other
coalitions (this happens, for instance, in public goods economies and in linear Cournot
oligopoly). Negative spillovers arise when a coalition is hurt by the merging of other coalitions
(this happens, for instance, in trade blocks problems and in R&D alliances). We will denote
by ¯ V the set of all partition functions, and by V + and V − the classes of partition function
exhibiting positive and negative spillovers, respectively. It is clear that V + ∪ V − ⊂ ¯ V .
Finally, an allocation speciﬁes the way in which the values assigned by v to the coalitions
in π are distributed within these coalitions.
Deﬁnition 6 An allocation for the pair (N,v) is a pair (u,π) ∈ Rn
+ × Π(N),w h e r eu is a
vector of imputed payoﬀs for the set of players N such that
P
i∈B
ui = v(B,π) for all B ∈ π.
Note that if v is cohesive, then whenever (u,π)i sa na l l o c a t i o na l s o( u,{N})i sa na l l o c a -
tion. For this reason, whenever dealing with cohesive partition functions we will always refer
to allocations of the form (u,{N}), that for simplicity we will simply denote by u.
2.2 Connected Networks as Organizations
In this section we make use of the notion of network (or graph) to provide a detailed spec-
iﬁcation of the interpersonal bilateral relations that shape the internal organization of a
coalition.
An e t w o r kg is given by a set of vertices N(g) together with a set L(g) of bilateral links
between pairs of vertices (that is, unordered pairs of elements of N(g)). A link between the
vertices i and j is denoted by ij. The network g is complete if ij ∈ L(g) for all i and j in
6N(g), i 6= j. The network h is a subnetwork of g (and we write h ⊂ g)i fN(h) ⊆ N(g)a n d
L(h) ⊆ L(g), with strict inclusion for at least one of the two sets.
Two agents i and j are connected in g if there exists a set of vertices (a ”connecting
path”) {i1,i 2,...,i k} ⊆ N (g) such that i = i1, j = ik,a n dipip+1 ∈ g for all p =1 ,...,k− 1.
The set of vertices S ⊆ N (g) is connected in g if for all pairs of vertices in S there exists a
connecting path all contained in S. The set of connected coalitions in g is denoted by C(g).
The network g is connected if N(g) ∈ C(g). The subnetwork h of g is a component of g if h
is connected and if there exists no other connected subnetwork h0 of g such that h ⊂ h0.T h e
set of components of the network g is denoted by C(g).6
The set C(g)={h1,h 2,...,h m} is made of m connected networks with pairwise disjoint
sets of vertices N(h1), N(h2),...,N(hm) .W ec a nt h e r e f o r ea s s o c i a t ew i t he a c hn e t w o r kg such
that N (g)=N the following unique partition π(g) ∈ Π(N):
π (g)={N(h1),N(h2),...,N(hm)}.
In this sense, a network g provides a more detailed information than the associated par-
tition π(g), since it also speciﬁes the organizational form adopted by each coalition through
the architecture of the various components of g.7 This motivates the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 7 An organization is a connected graph g.T h e s e t N(g) is called the set of
organizational members. The set of links L(g) is called the organizational form of g.
In the analysis of the next section we will make use of some additional notation, allowing
us to express the networks obtained by deleting vertices from a given network g with set of
vertices N.F o rS ⊂ N,w ed e n o t eb yg|S the graph with vertex set S obtained by deleting
the set N\S of vertices from g;t h es e to fl i n k sL(g|S)i sg i v e nb y{ij ∈ g : {i,j} ⊆ S}.
If g is connected but g|N\{i} is disconnected, then vertex i is called a cut-vertex of g.I f
g is connected but g|N\S is disconnected, then S is called a vertex-cut of g.
Three connected architectures that will play a central role in our analysis are the star g∗,
with one central vertex maintaining all links, the circle gc, with all vertices organized on a
circle, each maintaining two links, and the complete network gN, containing all links.
6It is clear that C(g) ⊂ C(g).
7The association of coalitions with connected networks is implicit in Myerson’s (1977) analysis; in fact, the
”Myerson value” allocates to each connected component the worth of the coalition identiﬁed by its vertices.
7Star network with n = 7 and circle network with n =6
3 The Design of Stable Organizations
In order to be stable, an organization must prevent all potential defections of its members.
In order to threaten the stability of the organization, such defections must be proﬁtable, by
this meaning that they must induce a payoﬀ allocation which is preferred by defectors to the
payoﬀ allocation adopted within the organization.
In this section we study how a hypothetical designer can shape the architecture of the
cooperation network in order to prevent such defection by means of an appropriately chosen
payoﬀ allocation. We will only look at the stability of organizations with set of members N;
although all results extend to the stability of smaller organizations (that is, on components
of a network g), focusing on N makes notation simpler. Section 3.1 looks at the eﬀect of
organizational design on the proﬁtability of defections, characterizing the relation between the
network and the outside options of the various coalitions. Section 3.2 looks at the relation
between the network and the ability of various coalitions to defect.
3.1 Incentives to defect from an organization
Consider a coalition S ⊂ N of members of the organization g,w i t hN(g)=N, and assume
that within g the payoﬀ allocation u has been chosen. In case of defection from g,t h em e m b e r s
of S are free to adopt any coalition structure πS in order to obtain a higher payoﬀ than at
u. This ”outside option” available to S depends, through the eﬀect of the spillovers, on the
8coalition structure that is induced on N\S by its defection from g. Central to our analysis
is the assumption that the way in which players in N\S will form coalition depends on the
way in which these players communicate in the organization g. More precisely, we assume
that the coalition structure induced on N\S is uniquely determined by the components of
the ”residual” graph g|N\S with vertex set N\S, obtained by deleting from g all vertices in
S. This approach can be justiﬁed as a form of myopic expectations of defecting coalitions,
who expect the existing links to characterize cooperative relations as well in the future.
Alternatively, it can be viewed as a formalization of the assumption that the network is rigid,
and it takes time to establish new cooperative relations or to sever existing ones.





By defecting from the organization g and adopting coalition structure πS, coalition S can






according to the partition function v. This leads us to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 8 Let g be an organization with set of members N and v be a cohesive partition
function. Coalition S ⊂ N has the incentive to defect from g under payoﬀ allocation u and









all B ∈ πS.
3.2 Ability to defect from an organization
In this section we consider a second aspect of organizational design, related to the possibil-
ity that the adopted organizational form impose constraints on the ability of coalitions to
communicate and coordinate without the help of the remaining members. Such constraints
are likely to aﬀect the ability of players to enact defections, which are typically the result
of a series of coordinated activities, such as the assessment of the actions available outside
the organization, the evaluation of the consequences of such actions, and their actual im-
plementation. An analysis of such constraints in the context of cooperative games without
spillovers is contained in Demange (2004), where the ability to defect from an organization g
is restricted to the class of coalitions which are internally connected in g. In the same spirit,
we denote as restricted communication t h es i t u a t i o nw h e r et h es e to fc o a l i t i o nw h i c ha r ea b l e
to defect from g is C (g).
The case of unrestricted communication is also important. All problems in which the
players are able to communicate and make contingent plans before the adoption of a speciﬁc
9organizational form should belong to this latter class. The same applies to problems in which
information is transmitted through the network independently of the will of the agents, so
that any two players who are not directly linked are still able to jointly defect from the
organization. In this case, the set of coalition which are able to defect from g is the set of all
subsets of N.
3.3 Stable Allocations within an Organization
Having described the incentives and the ability of coalitions to defect from an organization
g, we are able to formalize the notion of a stable allocation.
Deﬁnition 9 The payoﬀ allocation u is stable for the organization g with set of members N
under the partition function v if no coalition S ⊂ N has both the ability and the incentive to
defect from g.
We denote by Φ(g,v) the set of all stable allocations for g under v.
If the partition function v is fully cohesive, and the assumption of unrestricted commu-
nication is made, the set of stable allocations for g can be expressed as the core of the game










If v is not fully cohesive, and the assumption of unrestricted communication is maintained,
we can still obtain the set of stable allocations for v as the core of a game in characteristic














ui ∀B ∈ πS
)
.
A stable organization is consequently deﬁned by the existence of at least one stable
allocation:
Deﬁnition 10 The organization g with vertex set N is stable under the partition function
v if Φ(g,v) / ∈ ∅.
10Again, under the assumption of unrestricted communication a stable organization is one
allowing for a nonempty core in the associated game in characteristic function.
The results that follow record a monotonicity property that applies to the two classes of
partition functions with positive and negative spillovers. This property has straightforward
implication for the design of stable organizations, that we discuss in the next section.
Consider the eﬀect of deleting one or more links from the organization g, originating the









(see the proof of lemma 1 below).
It follows that if spillovers are positive, the outside option of all S ⊂ N is higher in g than in
g0, and if spillovers are negative, these outside options are higher in g0 than in g.T h e s ef a c t s
are formally established by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Let v be anonymous and cohesive. Let g and g0 be two organizations with set of
members N, such that g0 ⊂ g.
















for all S ⊂ N, πS ∈
Π(S) and B ∈ πS;
















for all S ⊂ N,
πS ∈ Π(S) and B ∈ πS.












. This follows from the
observation that adding a link to a graph never eliminates any of the existing connecting


































.A d i r e c t
application of the deﬁnitions of positive and negative spillovers implies points i) and ii) of
the lemma.
Consider now the implications of lemma 1 for the case of positive spillovers. Since all
coalitions’ outside options are higher in g than in g0, if communication is unrestricted all
allocations which are stable in g are also stable in g0. If communication is restricted, this eﬀect
on outside option is reinforced by the eﬀect of a larger set of potential defecting coalitions in
g than in g0. These observations lead to the following proposition.
11Proposition 1 Let v ∈ V + be anonymous and cohesive. Let g and g0 be two organizations
with set of members N, such that g0 ⊂ g.T h e nΦ(g,v) ⊆ Φ(g0,v).
Proof. Consider ﬁrst problems with unrestricted communication, in which the set of
potential defecting coalitions is the same in g as in g0.I fu ∈Φ(g,v) then for all S and all πS
we have
P

























.I tf o l l o w st h a tu ∈Φ(g0,v). Consider
now problems with restricted communication. Here, the set of coalitions with the ability to
defect from g0 is a strict subset of the set of coalitions with the ability to defect from g.T h i s
because if a connecting path exists between two vertices in g0, then the same path exists
in g. The above argument based on outside options can therefore be applied to the set of
connected coalitions in g0.
Although it is possible to obtain a strict inclusion for at least one partition function with
positive spillovers, the next example shows that this is not true in general.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3}, g0 =( N,{12,13})a n dg =( N,{12,13,23}). Let v be as
follows:
v({i},{{1},{2},{3}})=1 fori=1 ,2,3;












, which also belongs to Φ(g0,v).
Although player 1 has a higher payoﬀ by defecting from g than from g0,t h i si sn o tr e ﬂected
by any allocation in Φ(g,v)t h a tg i v e s1al o w e rp a y o ﬀ than to the other players.¥
Consider then the case of negative spillovers. A similar monotonicity property to that
established in proposition 1 applies here only in the case of unrestricted communication,
where the sole eﬀect of additional links on outside options are relevant (see the proof of
proposition 2 below). When communication is restricted, however, additional links enlarge
the set of coalitions with the ability to defect. While the eﬀect on outside options plays in
favour of stability, this second eﬀect plays against it, breaking down the monotonic relation
between higher connectedness of the organization and its stability properties.
12Proposition 2 Let v ∈ V − be anonymous and cohesive. Let g and g0 be two organizations
with set of members N, such that g0 ⊂ g. Under unrestricted communication Φ(g0,v) ⊆
Φ(g,v).
Proof. If u ∈Φ(g0,v)t h e nf o ra l lS and all πS we have
P


























It follows that u ∈Φ(g,v).
The following example illustrates the failure of proposition 2 in problems with restricted
communication.
Example 2 Let N = {1,2,3,4},a n dg0 ⊂ g be two organizations with set of members
N, such that L(g0)={12,13,14}, L(g)={12,13,14,23,24,34}. Let the partition function
v ∈ V − be as follows:
v(1,{N})=1 ;v(1,{1,2,34})=1− ε;v(12,{12,34})=2 ;v(12,{12,34});v(N,{N})=4+δ,
with ε and δ positive and less than unity. The following allocation is stable for g0 :
u2 = u3 = u4 =1− ε;u1 =1+3 ε + δ.
It is easy to check that the same allocation is not stable for g, since coalition {23} has an
incentive to defect and get v(13,{13,24})=2> 1−2ε. Although having the same incentives,
coalition {23} has not the ability to defect in g0.¥
3.3.1 Implications for Organizational Design
In this section we discuss which implications can be drawn from the obtained results for the
problem of organizational design. In the present context, we can identify organizational design
with the choice of a speciﬁc connected network g with vertex set N. Given that the value
v(N,{N}) generated by the the grandcoalition is independent of the adopted organizational
form, we can focus on the eﬀect of design on the stability of cooperation, in the sense made
clear in deﬁnition 10.
L e tu sb e g i nw i t ht h ec a s eo fp o s i t i v es p i l l o v e r s. It is clear from an iteration of proposition
1 that all the allocations that can be sustained as stable in at least one organizational form
can also be sustained as stable in some minimally connected network (or tree). Symmetric
13and opposite implications can be drawn for problems with negative spillovers and unrestricted
communication, where the set of stable allocations for the complete graph is the union of all
allocations which are stable for at least on organizational form. In both classes of spillovers,
the adoption of the outlined organizational forms allows the designer to achieve stability by
means of the largest possible set of allocations. In other terms, if adopted, these organizational
forms allow to achieve stability by imposing the minimal constraints on the payoﬀ allocation.
Although suggesting an intuitive relation between the degree of connectedness of an orga-
nization and its stability properties, the above results fail to predict a speciﬁc tree architecture
under positive spillovers (the choice will depend on the shape of the partition function) and,
under negative spillovers, leave the problem of restricted communication unsolved. The next
section addresses both problems in the speciﬁc class of ”egalitarian design problems”.
3.3.2 Stable egalitarian organizations
This section studies the problem of organizational design when the only allocation available
to the designer is the egalitarian payoﬀ vector ue (v), equally splitting the value v(N,{N})
among the players in N.D e ﬁnition 10 is rephrased here as follows:
Deﬁnition 11 The connected network g with vertex set N is a stable egalitarian orga-
nization under the partition function v if ue (v) ∈ Φ(g,v).
Egalitarian design problems are of interest from a normative standpoint when the partition
function is anonymous; moreover, as suggested by a recent work of Jackson (2005), the
egalitarian allocation should be expected whenever players make distributional arrangements
before the network has formed and when its structure is still ﬂexible. As we said, in this
paper the restriction to the egalitarian allocation has the additional appeal of allowing for
sharp predictions on the architecture chosen by the designer in problems with restricted
communication. We will see how, in such problems, positive spillovers imply the choice of a
particular minimally connected organization, the star, while the complete network and the
circle are predicted under negative spillovers, with equivalent stability properties.
Before turning to these results in more detail, we ﬁrst consider, for completeness, the
case of unrestricted communication. Here, both results of propositions 1 and 2 apply. How-
ever, under positive spillovers the inclusion relation turns out to be never strict, so that
organizational design plays no role for stability.
14Proposition 3 Let v ∈ V + be anonymous and cohesive. Let g and g0 be two organizations
with set of members N.T h e nue ∈ Φ(g,v) if and only if ue ∈ Φ(g0,v).














Suppose that ue / ∈ Φ(g0,v). In this case there exists S0 ⊂ N of size s0 and πS0 such that for












where b0 denotes the size of B0.
We will prove that this leads to a contradiction. Suppose we can ﬁnd a coalition S of size
s0 such that g|N\S is a connected network. Deﬁne the permutation σ so that S = σ(S0). In


















Conditions (2) and (3) contradict condition (1) when applied to coalition S.
To prove the result we therefore just need to prove that we can ﬁnd such a coalition S.
This directly follows from the fact that if g is connected, then for all k =1 ,2,...,n we can
ﬁnd a set of vertices S of size k which is not a vertex-cut for g. This fact can be shown as
follows by induction on k.F o rk =1 ,l e ti be the endpoint of a maximal path in g (there must
always exists such a path since g is connected and N is ﬁnite). Since it is an endpoint, then
all the vertices adjacent to i must belong to that path, which is still connected in g|N\{i}.I t
follows that the network g|N\{i} is itself connected. Suppose now that the hypothesis is true
for k = m. Then there exists a set S of size m such that g|N\S is connected. We now apply
again the result for k = 1 to say that there exists some i ∈ N\S which is not a cut vertex for
g|N\S. Consider then the coalition S ∪i. This coalition is of size m+1, and, by the fact that
g|N\S is connected, we conclude that g|N\(S∪{i}) is connected, which proves the result.
The same indeterminacy results does not hold for the class of negative spillovers, where
the inclusion proved in proposition 2 can be strict, as shown in the following example:
Example 3 Under the following partition function (with negative spillovers), the eﬃcient
egalitarian allocation is stable in a 4 vertex complete graph, but is not stable in a 4 vertex
15incomplete graph.
v({i};{i,jkl})=1 ; v({i};{{i},{j,k},{l}})=2 ;
v({i,j};{{i,j},{k,l}})=4 ; v({k,l};{{i},{j},{k,l}})=7 ;
v({i,j,k};{{i,j,k},{l}})=8 ; v({i,j,k,l},{i,j,k,l})=1 2 .
We have that ue(v)=( 3 ,3,3). Consider ﬁrst the complete graph. Each single player, by
defecting from the complete graph gets 1, each coalition of size 2 gets 4, and each coalition
of size 3 gets 8. Therefore, the complete graph is a stable egalitarian organization. Consider
now the graph in which only the link ij is missing. A defection by coalition (kl) induces
the partition {{i},{j},{k,l}} in which coalition {k,l} obtains a payoﬀ of 7 > 6=2 ue (v).
Therefore, this incomplete egalitarian organization is not stable.¥
We now turn to the more complex and interesting case of restricted communication.
Proposition 4 studies the case of positive spillovers, where additional links strengthen both
the incentives and the ability to defect. The restriction to the egalitarian allocation allows a
reﬁnement of the result of proposition 1, selecting a unique minimally connected organization
-t h estar.
Proposition 4 Let v ∈ V + be anonymous and cohesive. Let g∗ be a star organization with
set of vertices N. Under restricted communication the following facts hold:
i) ue(v) ∈ Φ(g,v) implies ue(v) ∈ Φ(g∗,v), for all organizations g 6= g∗ such that N(g)=
N.
ii) If n ≥ 4 there exists a function v ∈ V + such that ue(v) ∈ Φ(g∗,v) but ue(v) / ∈ Φ(g,v)
for all organizations g 6= g∗ such that N(g)=N.
Proof. i) Consider ﬁrst defections of single vertex. Note ﬁr s tt h a ts i n c eg is connected, it
must admit at least two vertices which are not cut-vertices.8 Let h denote one such vertex.
Note then that ue(v) ∈ Φ(g,v)i m p l i e s :
ue(v) ≥ v({h},{{h},N\{h}}). (4)
8This standard graph theoretic fact can be easily proved as follows. Let i be the endpoint of a maximal
path in g (there must always exists such a path since g is connected). Since it is an endpoint, then all the
vertices adjacent to i must belong to that path, which is still connected in g|N\{i}. It follows that the if g is
connected then the graph g|N\{i} is connected too.
16Positive spillovers and anonymity imply that for all π ∈ Π(N)a n da l li ∈ N :
v({h},{{h},N\{h}}) ≥ v({i},π). (5)
We conclude that no player has an incentive to defect from g∗.
Consider now defections of coalitions of more than one player. Let S be a coalition of size
s ≥ 2 connected in g∗. This coalition must include the central player in the star, since no link





N\S by the defection of S from g∗ is made of all singletons in N\S, and all other partitions




.L e t n o w S0 be a coalition of size s and
deﬁne a permutation σ such that S0 = σ(S). By anonymity of v, for all πS and all B ∈ πS,




























≤ s · ue(v). (7)
Inequalities (6) and (7) directly imply that coalition S has no incentives to defect from g∗.
Therefore, in order to show that g∗ is stable we just need to show that for each coalition
S connected in g∗ we can ﬁnd a coalition S0 of the same size as S which is connected in g.
Since one such coalition exists in g∗ for all sizes s =1 ,2,...,n, this adds up to showing that
one connected coalition Sk of size k exists as well in g for all k =1 ,2,...,n. This standard
graph theoretic fact can be proved as follows. Since g is connected, there must be a vertex i
in g such that g|N\{i} is a connected graph of size (n − 1) (see the proof in footnote ??). By
the same argument, there must be some vertex j in g|N\{i},s ot h a tg|N\{i∪j} is a connected
graph of size (n−2). And so on until size 1. So, connectedness of g implies that for each size
k =1 ,2,...,n, there exists a coalition Sk of size k that is connected in g.
ii) We proceed by ﬁrst showing that for all g 6= g∗ a coalition T of size t = 2 can be found




is not made of all singletons. The proof goes as




contains a coalition S with s ≥ 2,




contains only singletons, meaning that
the subgraph g|N\T is empty. Since g is connected, all vertices in N\T must be linked in g
17with either i or j or both. If all vertices in N\T a r el i n k e dw i t ht h es a m ev e r t e xi n{i,j},
then g is a star. We therefore consider the case in which at least one vertex h(i)i sl i n k e d
with i and at least one vertex h(j)i sl i n k e dw i t hj.I nt h i sc a s e ,{i,h(i)} serves as the desired





is not made of all singletons.

























where for all S ⊂ N the notation ¯ πN\S is used to denote the singletons partition. It is clear
that ue(v) ∈ Φ(g∗,v). Also, since we have shown that for all g 6= g∗ there exists a coalition

















which implies in turns that ue(v) / ∈ Φ(g,v).
Proposition 5 studies the case of negative spillovers. Here, the opposite eﬀects of addi-
tional links on the incentives and the ability to defect generate a trade oﬀ with two equilibrium
points: an incomplete structure, the circle, and the complete graph.
Proposition 5 Let v ∈ V − be anonymous and cohesive. Let gc be a circle organization with
set of members N. Under restricted communication the following facts hold:
i) ue(v) ∈ Φ(g,v) implies ue(v) ∈ Φ(gc,v), for all non complete organizations g 6= gc such
that N(g)=N.
ii) There exists a value function v ∈ V − such that ue(v) ∈ Φ(gc,v) and ue(v) / ∈ Φ(g,v),
for all non complete organizations g 6= gc such that N(g)=N.
iii) ue(v) ∈ Φ(gc,v) if and only if ue(v) ∈ Φ(gN,v).
Proof. i) Suppose ue(v) ∈ Φ(g,v). Let S be a coalition of size s connected in g. Then, for









≤ b · ue(v). (8)
18Such connected coalition S exists in g for all s =1 ,2,...,n.
Consider now a connected coalition S0 in gc of size s. By the structural properties of gc we




= {N\S0}.D e ﬁne now the permutation σ
such that S0 = σ(S), where S is a connected coalition in g. Anonymity and negative spillovers
of v, together with and the fact that {N\S0} is a concentration of all partitions of the set


















It follows from propositions 8 and 9 that ue(v) ∈ Φ(gc,v).
ii) We next show that there exists a partition function v such that ue (v) ∈ Φ(gc,v)a n d
ue (v) / ∈ Φ(g,v) for all incomplete connected networks g 6= gc.
We proceed by ﬁrst showing that for all such g there exists a coalition S which is connected
in g and such that the induced subgraph g|N\S is disconnected. Since g is not complete,
there exist three vertices, say i, j, k, inducing a line graph, that is, such that g|{i,j,k} =
({i,j,k},{ij,jk}). Suppose ﬁrst that j has degree greater than 2, i.e., that there are more
than two vertices linked with j in g.D e ﬁned the set H as the set of all vertices h other than
i and k for which there exists at least one path joining h and j that does not include i nor k:
H = {h ∈ N\{i,k} : ∃P(h,j) ⊂ N\{i,k}}.
Let ¯ H ≡ N\H.I ft h eg r a p hg|N\( ¯ H∪{j}) is disconnected, then the set H ∪{j} is the required
connected set in g. If the graph g|N\( ¯ H∪{j}) is connected, then {i,j,k} is the required
connected set in g.
To complete the argument, we need to consider the case in which every inner vertex of
every induced line graph of three vertices in g has degree 2. Consider again the line i, j, k,
and suppose, by contradiction, that j is not a cut vertex of g. In this case, there exists a path
in g connecting i and k that does not include j. Among all such paths, consider the shortest
one. It is clear that each vertex in this path is the inner vertex of a three vertex line, and
must therefore be of degree 2. This, together with the fact that g is connected, implies that
g must be a wheel.
Consider now the partition function v ∈ V − constructed as follows:
v(S,{S,N\S})=s · ue(v) >
X
B∈πS
v(B,{πS,N\S}) ∀S ⊂ N,∀πS ∈ Π(S). (10)
19It is clear that ue(v) ∈ Φ(gc,v). Let now T be the coalition of size t which is connected in g and
such that g|N\T is disconnected. Deﬁne by σ the permutation such that T = σ(T0)f o rs o m e
T0 connected in gc (we know that such T0 can be found since there exists a connected coalition























from which we conclude that ue(v) / ∈ Φ(g,v).
iii) Note that all defections by a connected coalition S in gN induces the same partition
on N\S as S would induce by defecting from gc is S were connected in gc. Since there exists
a connected coalition in gc for all possible sizes s =1 ,2,...,n, the result follows.
The obtained results can be again read in terms of organizational design. If spillovers are
positive, the designer will achieve stability ”more often” by adopting a star organizational
form, since the set of partition functions that admit stability under the star architecture
strictly includes the set of all partition functions that admit stability under any other archi-
tecture. If spillovers are negative, the same property is enjoyed by the circle and the complete
architectures which are, in terms of stability, equivalent.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
We have studied the relation between the organizational form adopted by a group of cooper-
ating agents and the stability of cooperation. The organizational form (formally represented
by a connected network) aﬀects both the incentives to defect - by determining the extent of
cooperation after the defection - and the ability to defect - by determining the amount of com-
munication available to organizational members. The analysis can be applied to the design
of all those socioeconomic organizations, such as ﬁrms, international organizations, economic
unions, political parties, from which members can at any time step out and interact in a non
cooperative manner.
We have found that certain basic structural features of the network can be related to the
stability of cooperation. Under positive spillovers, sparse organizations are more stable than
dense ones, while the opposite holds under negative spillovers. For the speciﬁcc a s ei nw h i c h
cooperation gains are split equally, the star and the circle turn out to have maximal stability
properties under positive and negative spillovers, respectively.
20We ﬁnally wish to stress two important simpliﬁcations underlying the present analysis.
First, the adoption of a partition function has set aside all eﬃciency issues in designing the
organizational form. In the presence of such issues, the architecture identiﬁed in this paper
may fail to be eﬃcient, and, according to our notion of stability, stable. Nevertheless, the
qualitative result that relates the cohesion of the cooperating group with its stability would
remain valid, although with less extreme implications. Second, players are assumed not to
be able to modify the network if not by disconnecting from it. For this reason, this paper is
not a contribution to the literature on network formation, where the incentives to form and
sever links are determined by an allocation rule which is sensible to the shape of the network
(see Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005) for an analysis of network stability with respect
to coalitional deviations).
A closer relation can be drawn with the literature on games of coalition formation of the
type ﬁrst introduced by Hart and Kurz (1983) and then applied to the context of games in
partition function (see the surveys of Yi (2003) and Bloch (2003)). The relation between a
graph and the induced coalition structure used in this paper can be viewed as a variation
of the ”gamma” and ”delta” coalition formation rules considered in Hart and Kurz. While
in that paper coalitions are associated only with completely connected subgraphs, in the
present paper coalitions can have an incomplete (but connected) architecture, and the relation
between this architecture and the stability of the coalitions becomes relevant. One corollary
of proposition 3 is that the conditions under which an egalitarian organization is stable are the
same under which the grand coalition is induced as a strong Nash equilibrium of the ”delta”
game of Hart and Kurz (1983) played under the coalition-wise egalitarian payoﬀ allocation
rule.
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